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Do I really feel it? The contributions
of subjective fluency and
compatibility in low-level effects on
aesthetic appreciation
Michael Forster *, Wolfgang Fabi and Helmut Leder
Department of Basic Psychological Research and Research Methods, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Vienna,
Austria
The causes for the liking of objects are multifaceted. According to the processing
fluency account, the ease with which an object is processed leads to a subjective
feeling of fluency. This subjective feeling is then interpreted as a positive reaction
toward the object resulting higher liking. However, evidence regarding the processes
underlying this relation is scarce. To show that the subjective feeling can indeed be
responsible for liking, we experimentally manipulated processing ease by providing false
physiological feedback (varying skin conductance indicated varying feelings of fluency)
and by varying presentation times between 100 and 400ms while participants viewed
line drawings of objects and rated them for liking. A first experiment showed that
both false physiological feedback and presentation duration influenced liking. Stimuli
primed with a (fake) visualization of a physiological correlate of high ease of processing
were liked more than stimuli primed with a low ease of processing. Liking ratings in a
no-feedback condition fell between the high and low feedback conditions. To explore
possible compatibility effects of coupling visual feedback to the fluency interpretation, in
a second experiment we reversed the feedback interpretation—visualization of high skin
conductance now indicated low ease of processing. The results show a similar pattern,
though the effect was subtler. This indicates that when the coupling of feedback to fluency
is less apparent or less compatible, the feeling is less strongly linked to liking. Our results
support the claim that variations in the feeling of fluency affect the appreciation of objects
in terms of liking. Together, the experiments suggest the contributions of processing ease
as well as compatibility to the experience of liking.
Keywords: ease of processing, feeling of fluency, aesthetic appreciation, liking, compatibility
Introduction
Current models of aesthetic appreciation indicate that liking is the result of multiple processing
stages operating at higher, but also at lower, cognitive levels (Leder et al., 2004; Jacobsen, 2006;
Pelowski andAkiba, 2011). For the effect of low-level properties, such as contrast (Reber et al., 1998)
or symmetry (Bertamini et al., 2013; Gartus and Leder, 2013), on liking the theory of processing
fluency provides a general explanatory framework (for reviews see Reber et al., 2004a; Alter and
Oppenheimer, 2009). The theory states that the ease with which an object (an artwork, a product,
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or any other scenery) is processed is accompanied by a subjective
feeling of fluency, which serves as a basis for several kinds of
judgments and evaluations (Reber et al., 2004b; Forster et al.,
2013; Garcia-Marques et al., 2013). This subjective feeling of
fluency denotes the experience of variations in the ease of
processing. As there are no objective feelings of fluency, the
addition of subjective strictly speaking is obsolete. It is, however,
commonly used to highlight the experience of the subject.
Therefore, in the following we call this experience the subjective
feeling of fluency, or in short, felt fluency.
In a typical experiment on processing fluency, the
presentation of images, words, or sentences is manipulated
to create conditions of lesser and greater ease of processing.
Variations in presentation duration (Forster et al., 2013), contrast
(Reber et al., 1998), or clarity (Reber et al., 2004b) are commonly
used. Though the processing fluency theory is not limited to a
specific level or sensory domain of processing, experiments have
mainly tested the impact of the ease of visual processing (i.e.,
perception) or the ease of memory retrieval (i.e., remembering
or recognition). In this article we focus on the ease of visual
processing as well.
Participants are able to consciously report variations in
felt fluency coming along with variations in processing ease.
Furthermore, higher ease of processing, in turn, influences
various evaluations, such as liking (Reber et al., 1998; Forster
et al., 2013), truth (Dechêne et al., 2010), familiarity (Whittlesea,
1993), or even sensory stimulus properties such as brightness
(Mandler et al., 1987) or loudness (Jacoby et al., 1988). Often,
the two outcomes of a manipulation of ease of processing,
felt fluency and liking, are also positively correlated with each
other (see for example Forster et al., 2013). It is, however,
still unclear whether we really use the feeling of fluency, i.e.,
the conscious representation of the ease of processing, for our
evaluations. We thus intend to test whether the feeling of fluency
indeed influences the liking of a stimulus. In two experiments,
we tested whether subjectively felt fluency is indeed a source
for our evaluations. Consequently, we contribute to the claim
that even such “cold” cognitive processes as perception—or
more specifically the dynamics of perception—can influence our
aesthetic appreciation of objects (Greifeneder et al., 2011).
According to the theory, the easier something is to process, the
more it is liked (Reber et al., 2004a). This is because the feeling of
fluency is claimed to be per se positive, because it signals a positive
state of affairs, error free processing, and absence of threat
(Winkielman et al., 2003). This positivity is then attributed to a
positive reaction toward the object (Winkielman and Cacioppo,
2001; Topolinski et al., 2009). Others claim that the feeling
of fluency is an affectively unspecific activation attributed to a
higher evaluation of the object (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992,
1994) or that fluency amplifies affective evaluations—positive
stimuli are regarded as more positive, negative stimuli as more
negative (Albrecht andCarbon, 2014). Conclusive evidence is still
lacking. A necessary first step, however, is to understand whether
and how the subjective feeling of fluency exerts its influence on
people’s evaluations.
Most researchers agree that there is a feeling of fluency,
i.e., a subjectively experienced representation of the ease of
processing (Reber et al., 2004b; Regenberg et al., 2012; Forster
et al., 2013; Jakesch et al., 2013). Though the subjective feeling
of fluency is not a necessary precondition for effects of ease of
processing on liking—ease of processing not necessarily needs
to become conscious (Reber et al., 2002; Topolinski and Strack,
2009)—the feeling of fluency was found to be correlated with
liking and usually can become conscious (Reber et al., 2004b;
Forster et al., 2013; Jakesch et al., 2013). Although Bornstein
and D’Agostino (1992, 1994) argued that conscious reflection on
ease of processing leads to a discounting of the ease, and thus
eliminates effect on the evaluations, others have failed to show
that discounting is an issue (Newell and Shanks, 2007; Forster
et al., 2013). Indeed, felt fluency seems to have an even tighter
connection to liking than an actual manipulation of ease of
processing (Forster et al., 2013). We thus tested whether making
participants explicitly believe their feeling of fluency is affected
does influence their evaluations of felt fluency and liking.
In two experiments we gave participants false feedback
about their ease of processing after viewing a stimulus (Valins,
1966). We told participants that their ease of processing could
be objectively measured by recording their skin conductance
response (SCR) to the stimuli. In Experiment 1, in each trial our
participants received either a fake feedback of high processing
ease (increasing SCR curve), a fake feedback of low processing
ease (decreasing SCR curve), or, as a control, no feedback.
For the false feedback manipulation to work properly, it was
paramount that our participants believed the feedback. Thus, in
post-questions we tested whether the participants were naïve to
the purpose of the experiment. Prior to data analysis, we excluded
all participants who explicitly indicated that they did not believe
the instruction or that they explicitly ignored the feedback. The
main results are thus only from participants who believed the
instruction. For the sake of complete reporting, the analysis
including all participants can be found in a Supplementary
Material.
A finding that feedback of an increasing SCR leads to an
increase in liking, and vice versa, could also be caused by a
mere compatibility between the SCR curve and the response
(Slovic et al., 1990). To exclude such an explanation, in a second
experiment we reversed the meaning of the SCR feedback: a
decrease in the SCR curve now indicated a higher ease of
processing, which should lead to higher liking, and vice versa.
We thus switched the mapping between the SCR feedback
and the participants’ response. In both experiments, the crucial
comparison is between the high and low feedback conditions. If
in both experiments a high feedback compared to a low feedback
leads to higher felt fluency and liking ratings then the conscious
reflection of the subjective feeling of fluency does influence liking.
As a second source of the subjective feeling of fluency in
both experiments we manipulated the actual ease of processing
by varying the presentation duration of the images between 100
and 400ms, a manipulation proven successful in previous studies
on fluency (Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001;
Forster et al., 2013). The longer the stimuli are presented, the
more information can be gathered, the easier they are to process
(Mackworth, 1963), and the higher the felt fluency. Thus the felt
fluency participants could use as a source for their evaluations
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consisted of the feeling derived from an actual variation in ease of
processing and of the false feedback. An effect of the variations in
presentation duration on liking should replicate earlier findings
that longer presentation durations and thus higher ease of
processing is linked to liking (Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman and
Cacioppo, 2001; Forster et al., 2013).
Having two sources of felt fluency—presentation duration and
feedback—furthermore allows studying how these two sources
interact. If we find an effect of feedback alone, it would mean
that a conscious representation of felt fluency overrides the
actual presentation duration manipulation of ease of processing
and governs the liking evaluation. If both the feedback and
the presentation duration have an effect or if they interact—
feedback of high ease of processing amplifies the effects of
presentation duration on liking and feedback of low ease of
processing attenuates the effects of presentation duration—then
both sources of felt fluency have their share in the evaluations. If
the false feedback leaves liking uninfluenced, then the conscious
representation leads to discounting of feelings of fluency as a
source for our evaluations (Bornstein and D’Agostino, 1992,
1994).
Experiment 1: Materials and Methods
Participants
In Experiment 1, 58 participants believed the feedback
manipulation and were thus eligible for further analysis. The
sample consisted of volunteers recruited by the experimenter
or undergraduate students from the University of Vienna
participating in return for partial course credit. Three
participants were removed from the final sample, because
they failed to show sufficient visual acuity (tested before the
experiment). Thus, the final sample consisted of 55 participants
(46 female, Mage = 23.4 years, SD = 4.5). All participants
provided written informed consent prior to their participation.
Participants were informed that participation and data collection
were fully anonymous and that they could withdraw at any time
during the experiment without any further consequences. The
experiments were conducted in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki (revised, 1983) and the guidelines of the Faculty of
Psychology, University of Vienna. According to the Austrian
Universities Act 2002 (UG2002), which was active at the time
the experiments were performed, only medical universities
were required to appoint ethics committees for clinical testing,
application of medical methods and applied medical research.
Therefore, no ethical approval was sought.
Stimuli
For the experimental trials we used a selection of 120 line
drawings of common objects (Rossion and Pourtois, 2004). As
the original images were very easy to perceive, all images were
overlaid with 60% Gaussian noise in Adobe Photoshop. This
also improved the plausibility of our manipulation of the ease of
processing. For the practice trials, 9 famous images (for example
the Coca-Cola logo, the Mona Lisa) and 9 non-famous images
were selected as targets. For the fake skin conductance response
(SCR) feedback we generated 200 random wave patterns with
Matlab 7.14 (code available upon request). The code was designed
to generate images closely resembling a physiological response
(see Figure 1 or Figure 3). Out of the 200 images we then chose
40 images, which best represented an SCR increase, and 40
images, which best represented an SCR decrease.
Design and Procedure
As a manipulation of the actual ease of processing, we varied
the presentation duration of the stimuli among 100, 200, 300,
FIGURE 1 | Sequence of a trial in our experiments.
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and 400ms (Forster et al., 2013). For each participant these
presentation durations were randomly assigned to the stimuli
with the constraint that each of the presentation durations in the
end was presented equally often. As a feedback manipulation in
each trial after the stimulus presentation, participants received
either a feedback of an increasing skin conductance response,
representing a high ease of processing feedback, a feedback of a
decreasing skin conductance response, representing a low ease of
processing feedback, or no feedback. The actual feedback curve
image was randomly picked out of the set of possible increasing
or decreasing curve images. The type of feedback was randomly
assigned to the presentation durations with the constraint of
ensuring that for each of the durations each type of feedback was
presented equally often. Thus, the factors presentation duration
and feedback were fully crossed.
Upon arrival our participants signed the consent form and
performed standardized tests for visual acuity and color vision.
Then participants were familiarized with the equipment and
the tasks. For our fake physiological measures, we used an 8-
channel bioamplifier (Mobi8-BP, TMSI B. V., Enschede, The
Netherlands). First, two flat Ag/AgCl-electrodes were placed at
the medial phalanges of digits III and IV of the non-dominant
hand. As no recording setup was preloaded on the device, no data
were recorded. Apart from this fact, everything else was identical
to an actual measure of skin conductance. This aimed to increase
the credibility of the manipulation.
Prior to the experiment, participants were also familiarized
with the plots of the SCR response and participants were led
to believe that previous studies have shown that high ease of
processing goes along with an increased SCR response. To render
the manipulation even more credible 18 practice trials were
administered where 6 very famous images (as for example the
Mona Lisa) were followed by an increasing SCR feedback and 6
non-famous images were followed by a decreasing SCR feedback.
The rest of the images—3 famous and 3 non-famous—were
followed by no feedback.
After these familiarization trials, the main experiment begun.
In each trial, a fixation cross was first presented for 2000ms
followed by the target for either 100, 200, 300, or 400ms.
Then a mask consisting of random noise was presented for
500ms to limit visual processing. Then an animated loading
screen indicating that the SCR response is being generated was
presented for a random time between 1300 and 4300ms. Both
the loading screen and the random time interval were included to
make the computation of an actual SCR feedback more plausible.
The loading screen was followed by the SCR feedback image
presented for 3000ms. Finally, participants first indicated how
much they liked the target (on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 not
at all to 7 very much) and then indicated their felt fluency, i.e.,
how easy the processing of the stimulus has been (also on a 7-
point scale ranging from 1 not at all to 7 very much, see Figure 1
for an illustration of a trial sequence). The felt fluency measure
also served as a manipulation check for the false feedback.
In total, participants performed 120 trials. In the end the
participants were thanked for their participation and thoroughly
debriefed about the purpose of the experiment. The whole
experiment took around 30min and was run with e-prime 2.0
(Schneider et al., 2002) on a display with a resolution of 1280 ×
1024 pixels at 60Hz.
Experiment 1: Results and Discussion
To investigate the effects of a false feedback and an actual
variation in ease of processing, we performed two separate
repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs). First, as a
manipulation check, we performed a 4 (presentation duration:
100, 200, 300, or 400ms) × 3 (feedback: high, low, or absent)
ANOVA with ratings of felt fluency as the dependent variable.
To investigate whether our manipulations lead to effects in the
judged liking of the stimuli the same ANOVAwas run with liking
as the dependent variable. For the ANOVA we first averaged the
ratings of each participant over stimuli separately for the four
presentation durations and the three feedback conditions. For the
overall means sampled over participants and stimuli see Table 1.
In all analyses, the level of statistical significance was p < 0.05.
When the sphericity assumption was not met, the Greenhouse–
Geisser correction was applied and the corrected degrees of
freedom are reported. For analyses of presentation duration,
we performed linear trend analyses, given the hypothesis that
ratings of felt fluency and liking should linearly increase with
TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for ratings of felt fluency and liking in both experiments separately for presentation duration
and feedback.
Rating Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Low EOP No FB High EOP Low EOP No FB High EOP
Felt fluency 100 4.32 (1.07) 4.51 (1.08) 4.80 (0.83) 4.38 (1.06) 4.51 (0.94) 4.69 (1.00)
200 4.58 (0.93) 4.81 (0.81) 5.07 (0.90) 4.64 (0.94) 4.97 (0.82) 5.12 (0.92)
300 4.70 (1.02) 4.92 (0.81) 5.15 (0.81) 4.97 (0.87) 5.07 (0.94) 5.27 (0.82)
400 4.83 (1.10) 5.07 (0.85) 5.24 (0.80) 4.89 (0.98) 5.31 (0.87) 5.38 (0.93)
Liking 100 3.57 (0.94) 3.81 (0.98) 3.84 (0.97) 3.57 (1.04) 3.59 (0.90) 3.68 (0.97)
200 3.72 (0.98) 3.78 (0.97) 3.86 (0.99) 3.69 (1.03) 3.81 (1.04) 3.73 (0.95)
300 3.72 (0.87) 3.83 (0.95) 3.96 (1.06) 3.79 (0.96) 3.77 (0.99) 3.85 (1.02)
400 3.85 (0.94) 4.00 (1.00) 4.01 (1.05) 3.74 (1.02) 3.91 (0.95) 3.93 (0.97)
Low EOP, feedback curve indicating a low ease of processing; No FB, no-feedback curve; High EOP, feedback curve indicating a high ease of processing.
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longer presentation durations. For the analysis of the feedback,
we compared the mean ratings in the low feedback condition
with the mean ratings in the high feedback condition employing
t-tests.
Felt Fluency
The repeated measures ANOVA with felt fluency as the
dependent variable showed significant main effects of both
presentation duration, F(2.4, 128.39) = 19.94, p < 0.001, η
2
p =
0.27, and feedback, F(1.30, 70.11) = 15.29, p < 0.001, η
2
p =
0.22, but no interaction, F(4.70, 253.54) = 0.17, p = 0.970,
η
2
p = 0.003. Linear trend analysis shows that ratings of felt
fluency linearly increased with longer presentation durations,
F(1, 54) = 37.99, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.41 (see Table 1 and
Figure 2). For the feedback manipulation, a t-test showed that
ratings of felt fluency were significantly higher in the high
feedback condition (M = 5.07, SD = 0.72) than in the low
feedback condition (M = 4.61, SD = 0.90, p < 0.001).
Interestingly, the mean in the no-feedback condition lay between
the two feedback conditions (M = 4.83, SD = 0.75; no vs.
high, p < 0.001, no vs. low, p = 0.006, see Figure 2). In
line with the manipulation intention, with longer presentation
durations and with high SCR feedback stimuli were judged as
easier to perceive than with shorter presentation durations and
with low SCR feedback. The facts that ratings in the no-feedback
conditions were numerically between high and low feedback and
that high and low feedback significantly differed from each other
indicate that we successfully made our participants believe that
the feedback reflected their ease of processing.
Liking
A repeated measures ANOVA testing the influence of
presentation duration and feedback on liking ratings showed
significant main effects of both presentation duration,
F(3, 162) = 5.86, p = 0.001, η
2
p = 0.10, and feedback,
F(1.71, 92.11) = 5.32, p = 0.009, η
2
p = 0.09, but no interaction,
F(6, 324) = 0.67, p = 0.678, η
2
p = 0.01. An analysis of linear
trends showed that the longer the stimuli were presented the
more they were liked, F(1, 54) = 17.14, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.24
(see Figure 2). For the feedback, a t-test showed that stimuli
in the high feedback condition (M = 3.92, SD = 0.96) were
liked more than in the low feedback condition (M = 3.72,
SD = 0.85, p = 0.009, see left side in Figure 3). Liking ratings
in the no-feedback condition were between high and low
feedback (M = 3.86, SD = 0.88). However, the mean was
only significantly different from low feedback (p = 0.011),
but not from high feedback. These results show that both the
actual ease of processing, manipulated through presentation
duration, and the false feedback influenced ratings of liking.
Both factors exerted their effects on how much the stimuli were
liked. Thus, neither did the feedback overshadow the effects of an
actual manipulation of ease of processing nor led the conscious
reflection through feedback to discounting of felt fluency as a
source for liking.
Correlations
To also show that evaluations of felt fluency and liking are
strongly related, we performed bivariate correlations. For each
participant we first correlated the stimulus ratings of liking
and felt fluency both over all conditions and separately for
all factor combinations. For further analyses the correlations
were Fisher z-transformed. The mean correlations presented
in the following are the retransformed Pearson correlations.
A one sample t-test showed a significant positive correlation
between felt fluency and liking, r(55) = 0.42, p < 0.001.
The correlations computed separately for all factor combinations
also show significant positive correlation between felt fluency
and liking, rs between 0.32 and 0.50, ps < 0.001. Furthermore,
FIGURE 2 | Mean ratings of felt fluency and liking in Experiment 1 separately for the three feedback conditions and the four presentation durations.
Error bars represent ±1 SE.
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FIGURE 3 | The effects of false feedback show that in both
experiments mean liking was higher following a feedback of
high ease of processing compared to low ease of
processing. This effect did not depend on the mapping between
the SCR curve and the ease of processing. Liking was increased
regardless of whether an increase (left side, Experiment 1) or a
decrease (right side, Experiment 2) in the SCR curve indicated a
high ease of processing.
a 4 (presentation durations of 100, 200, 300, or 400ms) × 3
(felt fluency feedback high, low, or absent) repeated measures
ANOVAwith the Fisher z-transformed correlations as dependent
variables yielded no significant effects. This indicates that the
correlations are similar in all conditions.
To sum up, Experiment 1 showed that false feedback
influenced the liking ratings of our participants. Supporting
the theory of processing fluency, participants awarded higher
liking ratings to stimuli in trials where a feedback of high ease
of processing was provided than to stimuli in trials where a
feedback of low ease of processing was given. In trials where
no feedback was given, i.e., where participants could only rely
on the actual ease of processing, they awarded liking ratings
that fell right between the two feedback conditions. These
findings suggest that both feedback and the actual ease contribute
to a feeling of fluency that is then used as a source for
liking.
However, using an increasing skin conductance curve as a
feedback of high ease of processing and a decreasing curve as
a feedback of low ease of processing we cannot exclude that
the effects on felt fluency and liking were due to compatibility
between the direction of the curve and the response (Hommel
and Lippa, 1995). In the second experiment, we thus instructed
a new set of participants that a feedback of an increasing skin
conductance response indicated low ease of processing and a
feedback of a decreasing skin conductance response indicated
high ease of processing. The no-feedback condition was left
unchanged. If the effects were solely due to compatibility then
the effects on felt fluency and liking in Experiment 2 should be
reversed to Experiment 1.
Experiment 2: Materials and Methods
Participants
In Experiment 2, 56 undergraduate students from the University
of Vienna (45 female, Mage = 24.9 years, SD = 7.8), who
participated in return for partial course credit, believed the
feedback manipulation and were eligible for further analysis.
All participants provided written informed consent prior to
participation. None of the participants has participated in
Experiment 1.
Stimuli
The same stimuli as in Experiment 1 were used.
Design and Procedure
In comparison to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 the meaning
of the feedback was reversed. In Experiment 2, a feedback of
an increasing skin conductance response represented a low ease
of processing feedback and a feedback of a decreasing skin
conductance response represented a high ease of processing
feedback. The no-feedback condition remained unchanged.
Accordingly, we adapted the introductory texts and the
practice trials to reflect the changes in the meaning of the
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skin conductance response. Everything else was identical to
Experiment 1.
Experiment 2: Results and Discussion
To analyze the effects of our manipulations on ratings of felt
fluency and liking we performed two separate 4 (presentation
durations: 100, 200, 300, or 400ms) × 3 (felt fluency feedback:
high, low, or absent) repeated-measures ANOVAs; once with
ratings of felt fluency and once with ratings of liking as
the dependent variable. In all analyses, the level of statistical
significance was p < 0.05. When the sphericity assumption
was not met, the degrees of freedom were Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected. For presentation duration, linear trend analyses were
performed and for feedback, we compared the mean ratings in
the low feedback condition with the mean ratings in the high
feedback condition employing t-tests.
Felt Fluency
An ANOVA with felt fluency as the dependent variable
showed significant main effects of both presentation duration,
F(2.14, 117.84) = 39.52, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.42, and feedback,
F(1.78, 97.62) = 22.21, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.29. The interaction
between presentation duration and feedback was not significant,
F(6, 330) = 1.22, p = 0.297, η
2
p = 0.02. Linear trend analysis
shows that ratings of felt fluency linearly increased with longer
presentation durations, F(1, 55) = 57.87, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.51
(see Figure 4). Thus, the longer the stimuli were presented the
higher the subjective feeling of fluency. Also in line with our
manipulation, a t-test showed that ratings of felt fluency were
significantly higher following a high feedback (M = 5.12, SD =
0.79) than following a low feedback (M = 4.72, SD = 0.82,
p < 0.001). The no-feedback condition (M = 4.97, SD =
0.77) showed ratings in between the two other conditions (all
ps < 0.007). These results indicate that (a) an actual higher ease
of processing (through variations in presentation duration) was
subjectively felt as more fluent and (b) false feedback had the
intended effect on felt fluency ratings. This means that although
we reversed the mapping, the participants still understood the
feedback as intended.
Liking
Analyzing how the manipulations are reflected in the liking
ratings, an ANOVA showed a main effect of presentation
duration, F(2.56, 140.70) = 9.49, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.15.
Linear trend analysis showed that liking linearly increased with
presentation duration, F(1, 55) = 18.01, p < 0.001, η
2
p =
0.25. For feedback, the analysis revealed a trend, F(1.70,93.41) =
2.55, p = 0.092, η2p = 0.04. This trend is also reflected in a
marginally significant difference in a t-test between the mean
liking ratings in the high (M = 3.80, SD= 0.89) and low feedback
condition (M = 3.70, SD = 0.92, p = 0.071, see right side
of Figure 3). Though not significantly different, the means in
the three different feedback conditions indicate that the liking
ratings were highest with high feedback, followed by no feedback,
and lowest with low feedback (see Table 1 and Figure 4). There
was no interaction between presentation duration and feedback,
F(4.89, 268.87) = 0.91, p = 0.471, η
2
p = 0.02.
With a reversed feedback mapping results for liking seem
less clear as in Experiment 1. The effects, though more subtle,
work in the same direction as in Experiment 1. Our results
indicate two things: First, the effects in Experiment 1 are not
solely due to compatibility. If this would have been the case then
effects in Experiment 2 should have been reversed to those in
Experiment 1. Second, compatibility between the direction of the
curve (increase) and a higher rating is nonetheless favorable for
effects of feedback on liking. The effects were more pronounced
FIGURE 4 | Mean ratings of felt fluency and liking in Experiment 2 separately for the three feedback conditions and the four presentation durations.
Error bars represent ±1 SE.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 7 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 373
Forster et al. Fluency and compatibility in aesthetic appreciation
in Experiment 1, where both false feedback and compatibility
work in the same direction.
Correlations
The relationship between felt fluency and liking is also reflected in
bivariate correlations between ratings of felt fluency and liking for
each participant. Overall, felt fluency and liking are significantly
related, r(56) = 0.46, p < 0.001. The correlations computed
separately for all factor combinations also show significant
positive correlation between felt fluency and liking, rs between
0.37 and 0.56, all ps < 0.001. Furthermore, a 4 (presentation
durations of 100, 200, 300, or 400ms) × 3 (felt fluency feedback
high, low, or absent) repeated-measures ANOVA with the Fisher
z-transformed correlations as dependent variables yielded a main
effect of presentation duration, F(3, 153) = 3.52, p = 0.017, η
2
p =
0.07. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons indicate that the correlations
at 100ms (r = 0.54) are significantly higher than at 400ms
(r = 0.43, p = 0.022). Furthermore, there was a significant
main effect of feedback, F(2, 102) = 3.48, p = 0.035, η
2
p = 0.07.
Though the means show that without feedback the correlations
tended to be higher (r = 0.53) than with high (r = 0.46)
or low (r = 0.46) feedback, in post-hoc comparisons none of
the differences reached significance (ps > 0.081). The interaction
between presentation duration and feedback was not significant,
F(6, 306) = 1.30, p = 0.256, η
2
p = 0.03. Though the findings
indicate stronger relations at shorter presentation durations and
without feedback, the correlations are all significantly different
from 0 and in the range of previous findings (Forster et al., 2013).
General Discussion
In two experiments we tested whether differences in subjective
feelings of fluency, manipulated through false feedback when
viewing stimuli, influence liking of those stimuli. Such a
relationship has generally been claimed in the theory of
processing fluency (Reber et al., 2004b; Regenberg et al.,
2012; Forster et al., 2013), but up to now remained largely
untested. Findings in Experiment 1 clearly indicate that the
false feedback, in addition to an actual manipulation of ease
of processing, contributes to liking evaluations. Our second
experiment highlights the boundaries and requirements for the
effect. Under incongruent mapping between feedback curve
and response direction—when an increase in skin conductance
indicated lower ease of processing and thus should lead to lower
liking—the effects of the false feedback were weaker, albeit still in
the same direction. Thus, the subjective feeling of fluency is used
as a source for liking evaluations given the interpretation of the
subjective feeling is straightforward for the perceiver. Effects of
presentation duration, an actual variation in ease of processing,
were consistent across both experiments: the higher the actual
ease of processing, the higher the liking.
In Experiment 1 feedback of a high ease of processing
increased felt fluency. Thus, participants correctly understood
the feedback trials. Furthermore, for ratings of felt fluency
a conscious and clear feedback of how easy something was
processed did not lead to discounting of this feeling (see
also Newell and Shanks, 2007). Our manipulation of ease of
processing through variations in presentation duration also
produced differences in rating of felt fluency, replicating previous
findings (Reber et al., 2004b; Regenberg et al., 2012; Forster
et al., 2013). Thus, both manipulations contributed to the effect.
Though the higher ease of processing not necessarily needs
to be consciously represented (Reber et al., 2002; Topolinski
and Strack, 2009), we can nonetheless conclude that both
our manipulations were successful—and effective—in eliciting a
subjective feeling of fluency.
Regarding our main hypothesis, in both experiments feedback
of a high ease of processing increased liking; in the no-
feedback condition liking ratings fell in between high and
low feedback. This indicates that without feedback participants
were affected only by the actual ease of processing based on
presentation duration. In the high and low feedback conditions
the presentation duration manipulation exerted additive and
independent effects, as indicated by the significant main effects
of both false feedback and presentation duration, and by the
absence of any interactions between the factors. Moreover, false
feedback did not override effects of ease of processing through
presentation duration. Possibly, themanipulations even activated
two different processes: one accessible to conscious reflection
(false feedback), another inaccessible to conscious reflection (ease
of processing). The results of the felt fluency ratings however
cast some doubt on this possibility. If our presentation duration
manipulation had been impervious to conscious reflection than
those variations should not have been reflected in felt fluency
ratings.
In Experiment 2 we tested the preconditions and the
stability of the effect by reversing the mapping between the
skin conductance response and feedback. An increase in skin
conductance now indicated a lower ease of processing. In
comparison with Experiment 1, we thus excluded that the effects
were due to compatibility between an (increasing) feedback curve
and (increasing) liking ratings. For ratings of felt fluency we
found nearly identical results showing that the manipulation was
successful. Despite the reversal of the feedback curve participants
reported higher felt fluency after a feedback of high ease of
processing compared to a feedback of low ease of processing.
Again the no-feedback condition showed ratings in between the
two other feedback conditions.
In Experiment 2, the direction of the effects for liking was
according to our hypothesis and in the same direction as in
Experiment 1. However, we found slightly weaker effects of high
vs. low feedback. This is also indicated by only a marginally
significant main effect of false feedback. Similar to Experiment
1, the manipulation of ease of processing through presentation
duration showed a main effect. This hints that both factors
contribute to liking.We can conclude from Experiment 2 that the
compatibility between the direction of the feedback curve and the
direction of the rating is a favorable precondition for the effect,
but not the sole responsible factor. Thus, compatibility seems
to ease the attribution of fluency as the source. From the rating
of felt fluency we can conclude that the feedback was correctly
interpreted. But the participants did not rely on it as strongly
as in Experiment 1 (see also Unkelbach and Greifeneder, 2013).
The difference in the number of participants who did not believe
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the instruction between Experiment 1 (n = 8) and Experiment 2
(n = 40) also supports the notion that compatibility renders the
influence of felt fluency on liking more plausible.
Our correlational analyses in both experiments corroborate
the findings just presented. Ratings of felt fluency and liking
in both experiments throughout all conditions are significantly
related. These results are well in line with previous studies
showing that ratings of felt fluency and liking are significantly
related (Forster et al., 2013).
As the results of felt fluency and liking in both experiments
are in the same direction and as both ratings are provided
in each trial, it is hard to clearly disentangle effects of our
manipulations on felt fluency from effects on liking. However,
in our instructions at the beginning of the experiments we were
careful to only stress the relation between feedback of skin
conductance and ease-of-processing. Relationships with liking
were never mentioned. Furthermore, using the same measures
of subjectively felt fluency and liking, Jakesch et al. (2013)
could show that subjective fluency and liking dissociate. As both
ratings were provided in each trial, it would also be possible that
liking influenced the subjective fluency. There are however no
theoretical reasons for why evaluations of liking should influence
the feeling of fluency. Also Constable et al. (2013) could show that
liking evaluations did not influence response fluency. We, thus
assume that in accordance with the processing fluency accounts
higher ease-of-processing led to higher liking and not vice versa.
Previous studies testing the effects of a subjective feeling of
fluency either ensured in pre-studies that the subjective feeling
of fluency is sensitive to changes in ease of processing or used
ratings of felt fluency as dependent variables (Reber et al., 2004b;
Regenberg et al., 2012; Forster et al., 2013; Jakesch et al., 2013).
Due to the experimental manipulation with a false feedback
eliciting a subjective feeling of fluency we can now more safely
conclude that this feeling is used as a possible source for our
evaluations.
Of course the ease of processing is but one factor influencing
our appreciation of objects (Leder et al., 2004; Bullot and Reber,
2012; Leder and Nadal, 2014). Though not yet empirically
shown, other factors such as color (Palmer and Schloss, 2010)
or personal taste (Vessel and Rubin, 2010) might well interact
with the ease of processing in establishing appreciation. At
longer exposure and deeper processing, ambiguous objects that
pose challenges in perceiving and understanding are appreciated
more than easily perceived and understood counterparts (Jakesch
et al., 2013). Nonetheless, first impressions and heuristics—
especially, when we have no clear preference or other cues
are missing—play a role in our everyday evaluations of the
environment (see for example in faces, Bar et al., 2006, or brands,
Lee and Labroo, 2004). Employing established procedures of
previous research we presented rather simple line drawings.
With more elaborate material higher-order cognitive processes
such as memory integration, personal taste, or expertise might
even override the low-level effects (Leder et al., 2004). How the
effects in interact with other factors remains to be shown and
is a challenge for further research on the formation of aesthetic
appreciation.
Our findings, together with previous research on processing
fluency (Reber et al., 1998, 2004a; Winkielman et al., 2003),
suggest the following preliminary model of processing fluency
(see Figure 5): Interactions between a stimulus and a person
FIGURE 5 | A schematic model of processing fluency. Higher ease of processing leads to a subjective feeling of fluency, which in turn influences our evaluations.
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looking at a stimulus vary in ease of processing. A number
of factors, such as symmetry, priming, or expectations (see
Figure 5), contribute to the ease of processing; in our studies
variations in presentation duration and false feedback (see also
Table 1 in Alter and Oppenheimer, 2009, for a comprehensive
overview). Ease of processing leads to a subjective feeling of
fluency (Reber et al., 2004b; Regenberg et al., 2012; Forster et al.,
2013), which can be consciously reported.
The subjective feeling of fluency is then used as a source of
information (see Schwarz, 2011, or Schwarz and Clore, 2007,
for an overview). Such a feeling of fluency affects liking, but
also other evaluations such as judgments of truth (Reber and
Schwarz, 1999) or familiarity (Whittlesea, 1993). In Figure 5
a dashed line from ease of processing to liking indicates that
ease of processing can influence judgments also without being
consciously perceived (Reber et al., 2002; Topolinski and Strack,
2009).
How the feeling influences our evaluations is not yet fully
understood. One approach (Box a in the model) suggests that
the feeling is per se positive, because it signals a positive state
of affairs (e.g., Winkielman et al., 2003). Thus, this feeling leads
to more positive ratings. Alternatively, the feeling of fluency
is an unspecific activation (Mandler et al., 1987; Jacoby et al.,
1988) leading to generally higher evaluations irrespective of the
valence of the rating dimension (Box b in the model, Bornstein
and D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). Another possibility is that the
feeling of fluency amplifies the affective evaluation of the stimuli,
but leaves affectively neutral stimuli uninfluenced (Box c in the
model, Albrecht and Carbon, 2014). Though most evidence is in
favor of the hedonic marking of felt fluency (Fang et al., 2007;
Topolinski et al., 2009), conclusive evidence is still lacking (see
also Unkelbach and Greifeneder, 2013).
On a theoretical level, the processing fluency account also has
its share in the longstanding dissociation between cognition and
emotion. In the light of our results, it seems futile to separate
such intricately interwoven processes when even such a strictly
cognitive process—the perception—has affective components
and can influence how much we appreciate our environment
(see for example Schwarz and Clore, 2007; Storbeck and Clore,
2007). This tight connection between seeing and feeling is
most probably due to a—phylogenetically or ontogenetically—
useful preference for the known (Zajonc, 2001; Unkelbach, 2006;
Schwarz, 2011). Thus, for aesthetic appreciation we would advise:
whenever looking at an artwork, just enjoy the pleasure of the
mere perception and indulge in your feeling of fluency.
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